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The central question addressed in this paper is:  does having a workplace or personal 
superannuation scheme result in a higher level of accumulation for retirement?  The paper 
presents a range of information about the participation and level of holdings in workplace 
and personal superannuation schemes based on data from the Household Saving Survey 
(HSS).  While the proportion of people holding a scheme is small (around 10%), the value 
of a scheme for those enrolled represents about one third their total net worth.  There is 
evidence that being enrolled in a workplace scheme is associated with higher levels of 
total net worth, yet this is not true of personal schemes, once several personal 
characteristics have been controlled for.  Nevertheless, it is evident that those in either 
workplace schemes or personal have not fully substituted this form of saving for other 
vehicles.  In fact in all cases there appears to be complementarity, whereby higher 
holdings in a scheme are associated with higher holdings in other forms of savings.   
Typically, an additional dollar invested in a workplace scheme is associated with higher 
total net worth of between one and two dollars, while for personal schemes the figure 
typically exceeds two dollars.  Two possible explanations for this arise.  The first is that by 
enrolling in a scheme an individual acquires heightened awareness of the importance of 
retirement saving and saves additional amounts in other vehicles.  An alternative 
hypothesis is that there may be some self-selection bias; those who have enrolled might 
be more inclined to save than the population as a whole.  There is no direct way to use 
the data to discriminate between these two possibilities.  However holding constant a wide 
range of other factors (including age, income, ethnicity, residence, etc) it is reasonable to 
suppose that the more likely sources of selection bias may have been controlled for.  If 
this is the case then the finding that more holdings of workplace superannuation are 
associated with greater total retirement wealth may well have arisen from an ￿awareness￿ 
or ￿recognition￿ effect of belonging to a scheme.  In this event, policies which foster 
enrolment might lead to greater retirement accumulation by those in a scheme. 
 
JEL CLASSIFICATION  J26 ￿ Retirement 
KEYWORDS  Superannuation; Retirement; New Zealand; Net Worth: Saving; 
Household Behaviour 
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The Impact of Workplace and 
Personal Superannuation Schemes 
on Net Worth: Evidence from the 
Household Savings Survey 
1 Introduction 
There is an ongoing debate, both in New Zealand and overseas, about the adequacy of 
saving.  This can be addressed at two levels: at the aggregate level of total savings in the 
economy; and at the level of individual households where the principal focus is on 
accumulation for retirement.  This paper is concerned solely with the latter and does not 
address broader issues of saving in the economy.  In particular it focuses on one aspect 
of retirement wealth accumulation: that of workplace and personal superannuation 
schemes.  The recent Periodic Review Group (2003) considered that there would be value 
in promoting greater use of workplace savings schemes and recommended that the 
Government establish a body to develop recommendations. 
The central question addressed in this paper is: does having a workplace or personal 
superannuation scheme result in a higher level of accumulation for retirement?  A related 
question is: to what extent do those who have such schemes fully offset their savings in 
the scheme by correspondingly lower savings in other vehicles; ie, is there evidence of 
substitution for other forms of saving, after allowing for differences in personal 
characteristics? 
To address these questions we draw on evidence from the Household Savings Survey 
(HSS) conducted in 2001.
1
  The definitions of the schemes are set out in Section 2.  The 
basic results from the survey are summarised in Appendix A.  In Section 3, the results of 
statistical tests of the effect of participation on total net worth are presented.  This is 
followed by results which report on tests designed to determine whether those enrolled in 
superannuation schemes substitute them for other forms of saving (Section 4). Discussion 
and conclusions follow in Sections 5 and 6. 
                                                                 
1 See Statistics New Zealand (2002).  
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2  Data and Definitions 
The data for this study are drawn from the Household Savings Survey conducted in 2001.  
This survey collected information on the assets and liabilities for unpartnered individuals 
and couples.  From this it was possible to estimate their total net worth.
2
  No allowance 
has been included for human capital.  Information was collected about superannuation 
schemes where the respondent was not yet receiving payments.  These schemes could 
be either a personal scheme (sometimes referred to as retail schemes) or schemes 
operated through the person￿s employer.  A person could hold either or both types of 
schemes.  If the respondent was partnered, information was collected separately on the 
schemes held by each member of the couple. 
2.1  Employer (Workplace) Superannuation Schemes 
These are schemes (either defined benefit or defined contribution) where the respondent￿s 
employer made a financial contribution to a retirement account held in the employee￿s 
name.  Workplace schemes do not include those where the employer merely makes a 
payroll deduction and facilitates the transfer to an account held by the employee. 
In the case of defined benefit schemes, the information was provided to the Government 
Actuary who made an estimate of the value of the scheme.  For defined contribution 
schemes, the respondent was asked to estimate the value of the scheme if it were cashed 
in on the day of the interview.
3
 
2.2  Personal Superannuation Schemes 
These are schemes to which the employer made no contribution.  The respondent was 
asked to estimate the value of the scheme if it were cashed in on the day of the interview. 
In summary, information is available from the HSS for the respondent (and the 
respondent￿s partner if in a couple) as to whether they had a personal or employer-based 
superannuation scheme and if so, its value.  It is not possible to identify whether the 
participation in the workplace scheme was voluntary or whether the enrolee joined at a 
time when participation was obligatory.  Nor is it possible to identify whether the employer 
of a participant in a personal scheme provided access and facilitated the transfer of 
contributions through payroll deductions. 
3  The effect of belonging to a superannuation 
scheme on total net worth 
This section presents the results of a series of statistical tests to assess whether 
belonging to a scheme is associated with higher total net worth. 
What effect does being enrolled in a scheme have on an individual￿s total net worth?  Is it 
higher for those with a super scheme, holding constant other characteristics of the 
                                                                 
2 The term net worth is used to describe the total accumulated wealth of an individual or a couple at the time of the survey.  From the 
HSS we obtained the value of net housing equity, financial assets net of liabilities and the value of pensions (both workplace and 
personal schemes). The sum of these items is referred to by Statistics New Zealand (2002) as net worth. 
3 Arguably, this would tend to understate the value of schemes where the member was not fully vested in the employer￿s contributions.    
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individuals?  This test must compare those at the same income, age, gender, ethnicity, 
level of education, geographic location, partnering status, migrant status, income, and 
main source of income. 
There are two possible reasons why we might observe those having a super scheme 
holding higher total net worth.  In the first place it might be that as a result of belonging to 
a scheme, the person acquires a heightened awareness of the need for saving and 
increases his or her holdings in other savings vehicles; ie belonging to a scheme ￿causes￿ 
higher total net worth.  Alternatively it maybe that we observe those with super schemes 
having higher net worth because they are ￿different￿ in some respect, over and above any 
observed characteristics for which we can account (age, ethnicity, education, income, 
main source of income, etc).  In other words, they have some inherent trait which leads 
them to have greater accumulations of retirement wealth in various vehicles.  This is in 
effect a problem of omitted variables.  Had we been able to measure and account for all 
personal traits that affected savings decisions, then arguably we might not observe any 
remaining differences in wealth accumulation beyond those arising by random chance.  
To conduct this test we fitted a regression equation with total net worth as the dependent 
variable, and a dichotomous variable for belonging to a scheme or not as an independent 






ii j i j i NW D Z α ββ ε =+ + + ∑  
where: 
NWi = Total net worth of the i-th individual 
Di      = 1 if the person or couple has a superannuation scheme (workplace or personal); 
            0 otherwise 
Zij     = a set of independent variable for personal characteristics (eg age, ethnicity, 
education, region, income, main source of income etc);
4
 
ε i        = a random error term.- 
The results for individuals are shown in Table 1.  Only the coefficients for the presence of 
a scheme are reported.  The coefficients are an estimate of the additional net worth 
associated with belonging to a scheme.  In the case of workplace pension, individuals 
having a scheme have $69,000 more of total net worth than those who are not enrolled.  
The comparison is for people of a comparable age, education, ethnicity, income, etc.  We 
also control for gender and partnering status but neither variable is significant.
5
  These 
results can be interpreted as follows: there is a 66% chance that the true (but unknown) 
effect in the population lies between $51,000 and $87,000.   
                                                                 
4 Age of both the respondent and partner (if a couple) is allowed for as a linear, squared and cubic term; income as a linear and 
squared term; education is measured by years of schooling plus post schooling training for both the respondent and the partner and 
ethnicity classified into two groups (Pakeha and non-Pakeha which includes Maori, Pacific Islander, Asian, and ￿Other￿).  
5 Similar results were obtained when we interacted the gender and partnering dummies with other explanatory variables.  See 
Appendix Table 9 for a complete listing of the control variables.  
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R2  Explanatory Dummy Variable 
No. of obs with 
dummy=1 
Coefficient t-value 
1  18  0.29  Has  a workplace super scheme  583  69,190  3.82*** 
2  18  0.28  Has a personal super scheme  880  10,074  0.86 
Has  a workplace super scheme  583  70,050  3.89*** 
3 19  0.29 
Has a personal super scheme  880  13,254  1.15 
Note: The coefficients are from regressions of net worth on a constant and a set of explanatory variables, based on a sample of 8356 
individuals.  In regression 3, we included two separate dummy variables for the type of scheme. The t-statistics are based 
on the test of the hypothesis that the coefficient is different from zero.  ***Significant at the 1% level. 
A net worth increase of $10,000 in favour of those enrolled is also found for personal 
schemes, but it is statistically insignificant.  It appears that the effect of personal pension 
scheme membership and that of workplace scheme membership reinforce each other; 
both have positive effects.  Furthermore, when we include the two membership dummies 
in one regression (see regression 3, Table 1), the coefficients and the degree of statistical 
significance actually increase.  
A similar series of tests were made for couples to estimate the effect of belonging to a 
superannuation scheme.  The results are summarised in Table 2.  In the first place we 
considered the case where either partner was in a scheme.  These results are given in the 
lines denoted 1 and 3 for workplace and personal schemes respectively.  The key finding 
is that if either partner has a workplace scheme, then the total net worth of the couple is 
almost $90,000 more than for couples in which neither partner has a workplace scheme.  
This result is statistically significant.  In contrast there is no evidence that when either 
partner belongs to a personal scheme total net worth is increased relative to similar 
couples in which neither partner has a personal scheme.  In fact here the difference is 
negative; ie, when at least one partner belongs to a personal scheme, the couple￿s net 
worth is lower than when neither has a personal scheme.  However the estimated effect is 
not significantly different from zero, implying that there is no evidence of an effect on total 
net worth among couples of belonging to a personal scheme. 





R2  Explanatory Dummy Variable 






1  19  0.28  Either partner has  a workplace super scheme  445  +86,198  2.0**  
Respondent has a WP super scheme, and  242  +14,923  0.53 
2 20  0.28 
Partner has a WP super scheme   232  +138,214  1.78*  
3  19  0.27  Either partner has  a personal super scheme  573  -13,561  0.54 
Respondent has a personal super scheme, and  375  +10,929  0.39 
4 20  0.27 
Partner has a personal super scheme   322  -45,181  1.88* 
Note: The coefficients are from regressions of net worth on a constant and a set of explanatory variables, based on a sample of 2982 
couples. The t-statistics are based on the test of the hypothesis that the coefficient is different from zero.  The regression 
numbers are included to indicate where more than one of the explanatory variables was included in the same regression 
model.  In Regressions 1 and 3, only one dummy variable was included, while in Regressions 2 and 4 two dummy 
variables are included. *Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level.  
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These models were then rerun this time including separate variables to capture whether 
the respondent of the partner was enrolled in a scheme.  The results presented in Table 2 
in the lines denoted 2 and 4.  In each case there is a separate coefficient estimated for the 
respondent and the partner.  In the case of workplace schemes, couples in which the 
partner (who could be male or female) belongs to a scheme appear to have much higher 
total net worth.  The difference is almost $140,000, and this estimate is reasonably 
significant, though the estimates have a wide confidence interval.  In this case there is a 
66% chance that the true difference lies in the range of $60,000 to $215,000.  These wide 
limits reflect the fact that there is considerable variability in the underlying data. By 
contrast, in the case of personal schemes a similarly significant impact is found for 
scheme participation by the partner, yet this effect has a negative sign.   
This section has considered whether or not membership in a scheme is associated with 
higher total net worth.  While not overwhelming, the findings are that especially for 
workplace superannuation, both couples and individuals in a scheme have higher total net 
worth than comparable economic units who are not members of a scheme.  The question 
then arises: do those who enrol in a scheme have higher total net worth because they 
also accumulate more in other forms of saving?  We turn to this question in the following 
section. 
4  Do those enrolled in super schemes 
substitute them for other forms of saving? 
A central question is whether or not those who enrol in a workplace or personal 
superannuation scheme simply substitute these schemes for other forms of saving; if so, 
then we would expect little or no addition to net household wealth, rather a rearrangement 
of portfolios.  Certainly, based on the findings of the previous section we would be inclined 
to conclude that in some cases there is less than complete substitution, and hence total 
net worth is actually greater for members relative to non-members.  The purpose of this 
section is to formally test that proposition.  In this section we first review some findings 
from the international literature (Section 4.1); we then present the results of tests for New 
Zealand based on the Household Savings Survey (Section 4.2). 
4.1  Some International Evidence 
In one of the earliest studies, Cagan (1965) explored the effect of belonging to an 
employer-provided (ie, workplace) pension scheme on personal saving.  He reported that 
those in workplace schemes saved more in other forms and attributed this to a 
￿recognition effect￿.  The workplace scheme was seen to raise awareness of the need to 
save for retirement and hence those covered in the workplace scheme tended to save 
more in other forms of retirement wealth accumulation.   
Subsequent research was based on the notion of expected pension wealth; ie, it is argued 
that the relevant concept is not whether a person belongs to a scheme, nor even the 
current value of the scheme, but rather the expected value by the time of retirement.  The 
difficulty of course is that considerable uncertainty surrounds this expected value, as it will 
be influenced by future health status, time to retirement, future income, bequests, etc. 
Munnell (1976) found a substantial effect, with expected pension wealth reducing private 
savings by as much as 62 cents for each dollar of expected pension wealth.  ￿The results  
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clearly indicate that, in contrast to earlier work of Cagan and Katona and others, pension 
coverage reduces savings in other forms￿ (p.1013).  In summarising other studies Venti 
and Wise (1996) write: 
￿Blinder, Gordon and Wise (1981), Hubbard (1985), and Avery, Elliehausen and 
Gustafson (1986) however, find little or no evidence of a tradeoff.  Diamond and 
Hausman (1984) find a modest tradeoff. Thus these findings would suggest that the 
tradeoff is far from dollar for dollar and the consensus view appears to be little or no 
effect￿ (p.26). 
In their own study Venti and Wise (1996) for the USA report that typically they find a 
tradeoff, with a dollar of additional pension wealth being associated with 4 to 19 cents less 
of personal financial assets in 1991.  However almost none of these results is statistically 
different from zero.  They conclude that  
￿￿.there is unlikely to be much if any substitution of personal financial saving for 
employer-provided pension entitlement￿ (p.25).  ￿This should not be interpreted to 
mean that employer pensions have no effect on individual behavior.  It seems 
apparent that employer pensions together with Social Security have led to dramatic 
declines in typical retirement ages and the labour force participation of older 
Americans. Thus even if pensions have not reduced the amount employees save in 
other forms, they surely have reduced the amount older persons earn￿ (pp.28-29). 
4.2  Tests of the Substitution Effect 
In this section we construct a formal test of whether those who are enrolled in a super 
scheme (either employer based or personal) substitute saving in these schemes for other 
forms of saving.  In other words if a person contributes say $100 per month to a workplace 
scheme, is it the case that they reduce the savings they hold in other forms of retirement 
accumulation by a comparable amount?  If the costs of subscribing to all schemes were 
approximately equal, and if the expected returns, rules of the plan and degree of risk were 
similar across schemes, then there would be no reason to suppose that people would not 
substitute, reducing commensurately their holdings in other vehicles.  This proposition 
follows from the life cycle hypothesis of consumption and saving, which would suggest 
that individual savings depend, among other things, on the income that people expect to 
receive in retirement from both public and private pension schemes. 
We exploit the cross sectional variation in the data to estimate the relation between the 
net worth and the value of holdings in a super scheme.  To account for the possibilities 
that this relationship varies from males to females and from unpartnered to partnered 
individuals, we include dummies for gender and partnering status, as well as interacting 
these dummies with the value of the pension scheme in question.  In the regression 
analysis, attention centres on the estimated coefficient on the variable representing the 
value of holdings in the super scheme (VS) and the differential slope coefficients in the 
following regression model: 
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ii i i i i i i j i j i
j
ANW D D VS D VS D VS Z αα α ββ β β ε
=
=+ + + + + + + ∑  
where: 
ANWi = Total net worth adjusted by subtracting the value of holdings in the super scheme 
for the i-th individual; 
D1      = 1 for males, 0 otherwise; 
D2      = 1 for partnered individuals, 0 otherwise;
6
 
VSi     = the value of holdings in the super scheme (either workplace or personal); 
Zij     = a set of independent variable for personal characteristics of the individual (eg age, 
ethnicity, education, region, income, main source of income etc);
7
 
ε i        = a random error term. 
If the slope (β1) is equal to -1.0, then any additional holdings in a super scheme would be 
fully offset by lower holdings in other savings vehicles.  This is the case of complete 
substitution.  If in contrast, the slope were negative but between zero and minus one, then 
there would be partial substitution.  Finally there is the possibility that the slope might be 
positive, indicating complementarity.  In this third case additional amounts in a super 
scheme are accompanied by additional amounts saved in other forms as well. 
It is important to control for the effect of variables that could result in a spurious relation 
between adjusted net worth and the value of holdings in a personal or workplace scheme.  
As Venti and Wise (1996) note: 
￿￿both pension wealth and personal financial asset saving will increase with income, 
thus without controlling for income persons with greater personal financial wealth will 
almost certainly have greater pension wealth as well.￿ (p.24) 
In the previous section, the finding that in some cases people who hold a super scheme 
have higher net worth, all else equal, provides evidence that they have not completely 
substituted scheme holdings for other forms of saving.  We now formally test for the effect 
of a super scheme on the holdings in other forms, by estimating the above regression 
model.  The value of both workplace and personal schemes was tested separately.  In the 
earlier results which tested for the effect of membership we included all observations in 
the sample; ie both those who had and those who did not have a superannuation scheme.  
To test the extent of substitution, only those people holding a scheme were included in the 
sample for estimating the regressions. 
                                                                 
6 D1  and D2 are only applicable to regressions on individuals.   A possible refinement to this model would be to interact each of the 
dummy variables ( D1 and D2) with each of the explanatory variables in the vector Z.  In principle this would have allowed for the effect 
on net worth of say, migrant status, to differ between partnered and unpartnered individuals and males and females.  In fact we did do 
this and run the extended model with all interactions, amounting to a total of 53 variables.  It was found that almost all the interaction 
effects were highly insignificant and the overall explanatory power of the model as measured by the R2 was hardly increased.  For this 
reason we pursued the simpler model without interaction terms. 
7 Age of both the respondent and partner (if a couple) is allowed for as a linear, squared and cubic term; income as a linear and 
squared term; education is measured by years of schooling plus post schooling training for both the respondent and the partner and 
ethnicity classified into two groups (Pakeha and non-Pakeha which includes Maori, Pacific Islander, Asian, and ￿Other￿).   
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To assess the robustness of the results, we have tried several estimators (OLS, OLS 
excluding outliers, median regressions, robust regressions, and log-linear form
8
).  It 
appears that the results vary considerably across specifications.  However, we have 
chosen to focus the discussion on the log-linear regressions, since from diagnostic tests 
and visual inspection of the residual plots this functional form appeared superior to 
others.
9
  Besides, the estimate of β 1 from the log-linear regression measures the elasticity 
of the superannuation scheme value with respect to wealth holdings in other forms.  In 
theory, these elasticity estimates convey more economically meaningful interpretations 
than absolute dollar estimates, since the marginal effect of an additional dollar spent on a 
superannuation scheme for someone who has a net worth of, say, $10,000 is not the 
same as that for someone who holds ten times as much wealth. 
The results are summarised in Tables 3 and 4.  In each panel, the estimate of β 1 is 
reported, along with the estimates of the differential slope coefficients β 2 and β 3 for 
regressions on individuals.  If the slope is negative, there is some substitution between 
the scheme and other forms of saving.  If the slope is positive then there is 
complementarity, and greater investment in a workplace or personal scheme is associated 
with greater total net worth in some or all other forms of wealth accumulation (housing, 
shares, bank deposits, rental property, farms or businesses, etc).  The remaining rows 
show the number of observations that were included and an adjusted R-squared statistic 
which measures the goodness of fit of the regression. 
Table 3 presents the results for individuals.  The Household Saving Survey provides 
information on assets and liabilities for unpartnered individuals and for couples.  However, 
it was necessary to estimate the net worth of those individuals who identified as being 
partnered (ie part of a couple).  To do this, we identified the persons in a couple and 
assigned to them 50% of all the net worth of the couple, with the exception that we 
allowed for separate information for each partner on their individual student loans and the 
value of their individual holdings in super schemes.  The results shown for individuals 
were obtained by pooling the data for unpartnered individuals and individuals in couples.  
For individuals, are super schemes a substitute for other forms of saving?  The answer 
appears to be no.  In the case of workplace superannuation, the estimated coefficient of 
the scheme value on the net worth in other forms is 0.25 for unpartnered females, 
indicating that higher savings in the form of workplace superannuation for these people 
are associated with a 25% increase in other wealth.  The corresponding effect is higher 
(0.32) for personal schemes.  For both types of schemes, the effect is halved for 
partnered individuals and is further reduced for males, so that the impact on other type of 
net worth of holding a workplace pension scheme is almost zero for partnered males.  In 
every case for both workplace and personal schemes, the estimates are significantly 
greater than -1, thereby rejecting the hypothesis of complete substitution. 
 
                                                                 
8 Where the adjusted net worth and the value of the superannuation scheme enter the equation in logarithms rather than in levels. 
9 The log-linear regressions give considerably higher R-squared values, more individually statistically significant t-ratios, as well as the 
most ￿well-behaved￿ residuals. These merits are, however, somewhat compromised by the fact that observations with negative or zero 
net worth drop out, as a result of the logarithmic transformation. Results from alternative specifications are available from the authors 
upon request.   
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Table 3 - Is a super scheme a substitute or a complement to other forms of 
retirement saving for individuals? 
 
Value of Workplace Super 
scheme 
Value of Personal Super 
scheme 
Slope coefficient 
1 ￿ β  (reference group: unpartnered females)  0.25 0.32 
t-value 4.74***  6.51*** 
Differential slope coefficient
2 ￿ β  (males)  -0.14  -0.06 
t-value 2.48**  1.23 
Differential slope coefficient 
3 ￿ β  (partnered)  -0.12  -0.16 
t-value 2.19**  3.08*** 
Sample size  553  835 
Adjusted R-squared  0.52  0.40 
Note: The coefficients are from regressions of net worth on a constant and a set of 21 explanatory variables, based on a sample of 
those people who are enrolled in a superannuation scheme. Adjusted net worth and value of the superannuation scheme 
enter the equation in logarithms rather than in levels. The t-statistics are based on the test of the hypothesis that the 
coefficient is different from zero.  **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level. The β 1 coefficients are also 
significantly different from -1 at the 1% level. For full regression results, see Appendix Tables 9. 
The final set of results is for couples (Table 4), where the models were estimated using 
the combined value of the holdings in workplace or personal schemes.  The results show 
that there is a positive relation between the amount held in either workplace or personal 
super schemes and the value of other net worth; ie, the more a couple has in a super 
scheme of either type, the more they tend to have in other forms of wealth.  This result 
corresponds to the case of complementarity rather than substitution.  The effect is 
strikingly similar between the two types of schemes.  More specifically, a 10% increase in 
holdings of either workplace or personal super is associated with a 1% increase in other 
net worth.  These estimates also significantly differ from -1, which allows us to conclude 
that the hypothesis of complete substitution can be rejected. 
Table 4 - Is a super scheme a substitute or a complement to other forms of 
retirement saving for couples? 
 
Value of Workplace 
Super scheme 
Value of Personal 
Super scheme 
Slope coefficient 
1 ￿ β   0.09 0.11 
t-value 2.70***  3.43*** 
Sample size  422  552 
Adjusted R-squared  0.42  0.32 
Note: The coefficients are from regressions of net worth on a constant and a set of 19 explanatory variables, based on a sample of 
those couples with at least one partner enrolled in a superannuation scheme. Adjusted net worth and value of the 
superannuation scheme (total held by both partners combined) enter the equation in logarithms rather than in levels. The 
t-statistics are based on the test of the hypothesis that the coefficient is different from zero. ***Significant at the 1% level. 
These coefficients are also significantly different from -1 at the 1% level. For full regression results, see Appendix Table 
10. 
The estimates of the slope coefficients (βi) from the log-linear regressions in Tables 3 and 
4 can be read directly as elasticities.  In each case they show the percentage change in 
net worth (excluding superannuation) of a given percentage change in the holdings of  
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superannuation.  An alternative way to interpret these estimates is to convert them to 
absolute changes.  This involves a simple adjustment described below. 
In general an elasticity is defined as  (/) . ( / ) YXX Y η =∂ ∂ where in this case: 
Y = the value of total net worth excluding the value of holdings in workplace or personal 
superannuation; and 
X = the value of holdings in workplace or personal superannuation. 
The marginal impact on total net worth of a dollar invested in superannuation schemes is 
then found as  [ ] // ( / ) 1 YX X Y η ∂∂ = +  where the effect has been evaluated at the median 
ratio of (X/Y), and the term +1 is included so as to capture the effect on total net worth 
rather than on just net worth in vehicles other than superannuation schemes.  The results 
are reported in Table 5. 
The striking feature is that in all but one case the effect is greater than unity.  In other 
words, these results lead to the conclusion that an additional dollar invested in 
superannuation schemes is associated with a more than proportionate and significant 
increase in total net worth.  There is no substantial evidence that those contributing to 
such schemes do so by reducing their holdings in other vehicles. The effect is strongest 
for unpartnered males in personal schemes. 
Table 5 - The impact on total net worth associated with an additional $1 invested in 
workplace or personal superannuation schemes 
 Workplace  Personal 
  Elasticity  Marginal dollar effect  Elasticity  Marginal dollar effect 
Individuals      
-Unpartnered females  0.25  $    1.74  0.32  $    3.00 
-Unpartnered males  0.11  $    2.10  0.26  $    5.33 
-Partnered females  0.13  $    1.81  0.16  $    2.14 
-Partnered males  -0.01  $    0.98  0.10  $    1.50 
Couples  0.09  $    1.47  0.11  $    2.00 
Notes: In the case of couples the combined holdings of the partners in either workplace or personal superannuation has been used. 
The estimates of the impact are derived by taking the regression coefficients from the log-linear model and dividing by the 
median ratio of the holdings of superannuation funds (either workplace or personal) to the total net worth excluding 
superannuation holdings. Note that to the resulting effect one dollar has been added to get to the total effect. 
5 Discussion 
The central policy question that underlies this analysis of the HSS is: would more 
widespread use of workplace superannuation schemes increase the total level of 
retirement wealth of participants? 
This question can be broken down into two parts:  
(a) Would the current level of participation be increased by some policy intervention?  
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(b) Given that a person has made the decision to participate, does belonging to a 
workplace scheme lead to a net increase in retirement wealth?  
The HSS offers no guidance on the first question.  It is possible that through making 
information available about workplace schemes more employees might be encouraged to 
sign-up.  This assumes that the private providers of superannuation schemes are not 
offering an adequate level of information at present, an argument which might be difficult 
to sustain.  However, there is evidence that offering the scheme as a default to new 
employees who would have to write a letter requesting not to be included, may raise the 
participation rates (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003).  Beyond that there is the Australian model 
where participation is compulsory (Drew and Stanford, 2003). 
It may be that because of myopia, people do not in fact save at the rate which would allow 
them to smooth their consumption through retirement.
10
  Only when they eventually retire 
will they realise that they should have saved more.  It is conceivable that by being enrolled 
as a default in a workplace scheme with automatic payroll deductions, the transaction 
costs of making a conscious decision to open a retirement account and then meet 
voluntary monthly payments could be reduced for some people. 
Thaler and Benartzi (2001) argue that employees have difficulty making adequate savings 
commitments and hence save at a level which is less than that which they will 
subsequently desire. 
The employees who fail to join the plan, or who participate at a very low level, appear 
to be saving at less than the predicted lifecycle savings rates. Behavioral explanations 
for this behavior stress bounded rationality and self-control and suggest that at least 
some of the low-saving households are making a mistake, and would welcome an aid 
to help their saving decision making (p.1). 
They propose a scheme whereby people commit in advance to allocate a portion of their 
future salary increases toward retirement savings.  Their key findings are: (1) Most people 
(78 percent) who were offered the plan elected to use it; (2) virtually everyone (98 
percent) who joined the plan remained in it through two pay raises, and the vast majority 
(80 percent) remained in it through the third pay raise; and (3) The average saving rates 
for SMT plan participants increased from 3.5 percent to 11.6 percent over the course of 28 
months. They conclude that the results suggest that behavioural economics can be used 
to design effective prescriptive programs for important economic decisions. 
Further support for the importance of the design of a savings plan comes from Choi, 
Laibson and Madrian (2004) who report on experiments with the 401(k) plan offered in the 
USA under different conditions. When left to decide whether to enrol, in one trial 90% of 
employees opted not to.  However, where they had to make an explicit statement to avoid 
being enrolled automatically, only 30% failed to enrol.  While employees often felt that 
they could not save more at present, most would agree to save some or all of any future 
pay rises.  In a final experiment the author￿s found that if employees were given the option 
to enrol with no deadline, two thirds failed to ever enrol.  In contrast, if a deadline was 
imposed two thirds actually enrolled.  They conclude: 
We assess the impact of 401(k) plan design on four different 401(k) savings 
outcomes: participation in the 401(k) plan, the distribution of employee contribution 
                                                                 
10 Scobie and Le (2004) present evidence that overall, people do however seem to be saving in a manner consistent with consumption 
smoothing, although this does not preclude the possibility that some individuals are myopic.  
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rates, asset allocation, and cash distributions. We show that plan design can have an 
important effect on all of these savings outcomes. This suggests an important role for 
both employers in determining how to structure their 401(k) plans and government 
regulators in creating institutions that encourage or discourage particular aspects of 
401(k) plan design.  
Results from a New Zealand survey by ACNeilsen
11
 in 1996 showed that 57% of eligible 
employees were enrolled in a workplace scheme where this was offered by their 
employer.  In the case of firms not offering a scheme, 58% of all eligible employees said 
they would participate were such a scheme to be offered by their employer. 
We now turn to the second question posed at the beginning of this section. Even if the 
participation rates were to increase, it does not follow automatically that the new enrolees 
will accumulate more retirement wealth than that which they would have had in the 
absence of the scheme.  As a starting point one could argue that if people pursue a 
consumption smoothing objective over the life-cycle, then they will have a target level of 
saving that they consider necessary to provide an adequate retirement income (Gibson 
and Scobie, 2003).  Assuming there are a number of savings vehicles on offer they will 
choose those which offer their preferred combination of risk, expected return and 
flexibility.  Were they to enrol in a workplace scheme, it is possible that they would simply 
adjust the level of savings in other vehicles such that their total rate of accumulation would 
remain virtually unchanged; ie, in the extreme there could be complete substitution, with 
no increase in total retirement accumulation.  In practice, we would not expect to observe 
complete substitution as the risk and return properties of different savings vehicles are 
typically different, implying they are less than perfect substitutes. 
The results of this study do, however, provide a fairly solid results on the question of 
substitution.  It was found that couples in which either partner has a workplace 
superannuation scheme, have a significantly higher level of total net worth, by almost 
$90,000.  In addition it is found that the median value of holdings by couples in a 
workplace scheme is around $40,000.  This suggests that couples in which a partner has 
a scheme have chosen to accumulate funds in workplace superannuation without making 
comparable reductions in other forms of saving.  Their median holdings in other forms are 
in fact comparable to those who have no workplace scheme.   
Some caution is needed in drawing policy conclusions from these results. Even in the 
case where those having a scheme have higher total net worth, this could reflect a self-
selection bias.  In other words, amongst the total population there are some with a greater 
proclivity toward saving (the ￿squirrel￿ effect), and perhaps it is them who have enrolled in 
workplace schemes.  Belonging to a scheme per se does not raise wealth; rather, it is the 
unobservable characteristics associated with those who chose to enrol in a scheme that 
makes them wealthier.  Even in the absence of such schemes it is likely they would have 
had higher accumulations in any event. 
If certain people are ￿squirrels￿, and superannuation schemes are not subsidised, we 
would expect them to save more than those who lack such a proclivity, other things being 
equal.  However there would be no reason to expect that they would systematically save 
more superannuation schemes.  Likewise we would not expect the non-squirrels to 
systematically avoid superannuation schemes. In other words, ￿squirrelness￿ would be 
associated with the amount of total saving, but not necessarily with its allocation.  Yet the 
                                                                 
11 As reported by Wendy Stockwell ￿The Workplace-Employer and Employee Attitudes￿, a presentation to the Office of the Retirement 
Commissioner, Wellington, March, 2004.  
WP 04/08 |  THE IMPACT OF WORKPLACE AND PERSONAL 
SUPERANNUATION SCHEMES ON NET WORTH 
13
 
data from the HSS show that those in a superannuation scheme are higher savers, 
suggesting that what we observe in the data is not necessarily due to the squirrel effect 
where schemes are not subsidised. 
In fact we know that by definition the workplace schemes did involve some employer 
contribution, and it would seem that for many people it would be advantageous to enrol in 
order to capture this benefit.  However, we would expect both squirrels and non-squirrels 
to respond equally to the incentive of a subsidy, with no systematic relation between 
holdings in a scheme and higher total wealth.  But in fact we do observe such a 
relationship, again suggesting that we can reject the squirrel hypothesis.   
A variant of this argument is to note that randomly making a subsidised scheme available 
in a subset of workplaces (and hence to a random group of employees) means that the 
variable ￿holding a workplace scheme￿ could be interpreted as exogenously given.  This 
would suggest that the causality runs from ￿holding a scheme￿ to ￿higher net worth￿, rather 
than the other way around, in which those with higher net worth sought out a scheme.  
This would suggest again that ￿squirrelness￿ is not the underlying explanation of the 
results. 
All the workplace schemes in the survey involve an employer contribution.  What might be 
the effect of these contributions to a workplace scheme?  In part the answer will depend 
on whether the employer￿s contribution has a subsidy element which is not offset by 
reduced wages or other benefits.  If there is a genuine subsidy this would represent an 
increase in the total benefit package.  In a survey covering 162 firms and 306,000 
employees including 78 of New Zealand￿s largest 100 employers (Periodic Review Group 
2003) 89% of all employees were in workplace plans that involved a subsidy.  50% of the 
plans subsidised the fees, 40% provided subsidised life and or disability insurance, and 
75% made a contribution to retirement savings. 
Employer subsidies can be viewed as equivalent ti an increase in the interest rate paid by 
the superannuation scheme relative to other savings vehicles.  Like all changes in interest 
rates there are two opposing effects on saving.  The first is to make present consumption 
dearer relative to future consumption, encouraging less consumption now and an increase 
in saving; the second constitutes an equivalent income increase which may lead to higher 
present consumption and lower saving.  Inevitably the net effect is uncertain from a 
theoretical standpoint.  In this study to the extent that workplace schemes offer a higher 
implicit rate of interest than competing vehicles, there does seem to be some positive 
effect on net savings.  Nevertheless, the role of subsidies is not to be exaggerated, as a 
very similar pattern was observed for personal superannuation, where schemes are 100% 
privately funded.  
Alternatively, the employer contributions could be in lieu of cash payments so the total 
benefit package remains the same.  In that case it is to be expected that other savings 
would fall from the lower disposable income to offset the rise in saving through the 
employer scheme.  The end result is that even in the presence of employer contributions 
there could be total offset. 
Another possible explanation for the finding that there is no substitution by those who hold 
workplace schemes (and in fact there is evidence of complementarity) is that those who 
joined a scheme did so as a result of financial education in the workplace (Bernheim and 
Garrett, 2003).  Not only did this encourage them to participate in the work based scheme, 
but it also led to them increasing the savings they made in other vehicles above that which  
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they would have made in the absence of the workplace scheme. This is the ￿recognition￿ 
effect first identified by Cagan. 
It is possible that complementarity arises from a desire to achieve a portfolio that offers 
the optimal balance between risk and return. Having invested in a workplace scheme, the 
participants chose to balance that investment with additional savings in vehicles which, 
while offering a different risk-return profile, have the effect of making the risk-return profile 
for the entire portfolio more in line with their preferences.  The net effect is that total net 
worth is increased. 
A further reason for the incomplete substitution, and in fact complementarity, is that some 
people might follow a hierarchical ordering in their saving patterns, first accumulating 
funds in a superannuation scheme and then subsequently saving in other forms (property, 
equities, etc). 
Finally, we might expect to observe less than full substitution merely because the 
characteristics of pension schemes differ from those of other savings vehicles.   Attanasio 
and Brugiavini (2003) identify a number of reasons why in fact pension wealth may not be 
a good substitute for financial saving in other forms.  While their discussion relates to the 
pension wealth that individuals have in public schemes, their arguments apply in principle 
to holdings in workplace and personal superannuation schemes.  They note that 
￿￿future pension benefits are not liquid and cannot be borrowed against: individuals 
might be liquidity constrained at some points in time; the implicit rate of return on 
pensions is not the same as financial savings.  In other words, financial and insurance 
market arrangements (including tax treatment of pension and financial instruments) 
and different welfare provisions may produce a variety of observed saving patterns 
and of substitutability results￿ (pp. 1075-1076). 
The illiquidity of pension benefits is less of an issue in NZ where most schemes are either 
lump sum or allow pensions to be exchanged for a lump sum.  However, they are still less 
flexible than other forms of saving as they are normally not accessible until resignation. 
6 Conclusions 
The HSS provides an opportunity to examine the retirement accumulations of those who 
report having superannuation schemes, either workplace or personal schemes.   
Workplace schemes are defined in the HSS as those involving an employer contribution.  
For those who had joined a workplace some time ago, it is possible that membership was 
compulsory.  However that is no longer typically the case.  
For both individuals and couples, it appears that those who belong to a workplace 
superannuation scheme have a considerably higher level of net worth. However, for 
personal schemes, the difference in net worth between holders and non-holders becomes 
statistically insignificant once such socio-economic variables as age, gender, education, 
region of residence, income, main source of income, and so on have been accounted for.  
A formal test was made of the relationship between the value of holdings in a 
superannuation scheme and the value of net worth in other forms of saving.  It is possible 
that where a person has chosen to participate in a workplace scheme, they would regard 
their saving in this scheme as a substitute for other forms of saving.  In fact, in the limit, 
there could be perfect substitution, whereby for every additional dollar held in the  
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workplace scheme, one less dollar would be held in other vehicles.  A less extreme case 
could involve partial substitution, and finally there might be complementarity.  In this latter 
case, the individual would hold more in other vehicles as well as increased holdings in a 
workplace scheme. 
In every case examined, for both workplace and personal schemes, we can reject the 
hypothesis of perfect substitution.  In the only case where the results suggested partial 
substitution, the effect was typically small in absolute value and not statistically different 
from zero. 
Finally for most cases we found significant complementarity.  Regardless of gender and 
partnering status, individuals held more in other vehicles when they contributed to 
personal schemes.  The corresponding effect is a little weaker, yet still significant, for 
workplace schemes.  For both types of schemes, the effect was much stronger for 
partnered females than for partnered males and for unpartnered than for partnered 
individuals.   
When these proportional changes are translated into dollar amounts, the results are 
impressive.  An additional $1 in a workplace scheme is associated with a higher total net 
wealth accumulation of $1.74 for unpartnered females and $2.10 for unpartnered males.  
For couples the effect is $1.47.  In the case of personal schemes the corresponding 
values are $3.00 for unpartnered females, $5.33 for unpartnered males and $2.00 for 
couples. 
In summary, there is evidence that those enrolled in workplace or personal schemes do 
have higher net worth than those not in such schemes.  However, it must be stressed that 
the effects are not estimated with any great precision.  They have wide margins 
associated with them, reflecting considerable variability in the underlying sample.  In 
addition,  we find no evidence of any substitution away from other forms of saving when 
an individual enrols in a workplace or personal scheme.  For both types of scheme, there 
is evidence that people in fact have higher wealth in other forms, indicating 
complementarity rather than substitution. 
This study has been based on observed wealth accumulation at a single point in time.  
This does not allow us to trace the lifetime patterns of earnings, consumption and saving 
of particular age cohorts.  It is possible for example, that decisions by older individuals 
about labour force participation and retirement might well be influenced by their wealth 
accumulation in superannuation schemes.  If that were the case their lifetime earnings 
and savings might differ from those not in superannuation schemes.   
It is possible that some people who were in a scheme in the past may have had the 
opportunity to withdraw either through resignation or moving to a fully cashed up 
remuneration package.  Whether or not they reinvested the accumulations or spent them 
cannot be determined from the information contained in the HSS. 
The principal caveat that should be borne in mind when interpreting the results of this 
study is that those who have voluntarily chosen to belong to a scheme might not 
necessarily have the same characteristics as the population as a whole. They could be 
drawn from a sub-population of those who have a greater propensity to save.  It is true 
that the results have accounted for the influence of wide range of other factors (including 
age, ethnicity, migrant status, region, income and main source of income).  It might be 
reasonably argued that these factors have controlled for at least some of the selection 
bias, so that the results do indicate a genuine influence on total net worth arising from the 
use of superannuation schemes.  However the possibility that there are other unobserved  
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characteristics of people (such as their attitude to risk or their preference for consumption 
now rather than in the future) for which we have not accounted, cannot be ruled out.  
If this were the explanation for why we observe those with superannuation schemes 
having higher net worth in total, then it is not clear that there any immediate policy 
implications to draw.   
In contrast, if the fact of having joined a workplace scheme results in a ￿recognition￿ or 
￿heightened awareness￿ of the need for saving, then arguably policies which promote 
voluntary enrolment in workplace schemes by providing information, reducing the costs of 
joining and removing any barriers might well foster increased retirement accumulation in 
total.  The evidence does suggest this outcome is entirely possible.  
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Appendix A: Descriptive Results from the Survey 
This appendix presents the results derived from the survey.  We examine the proportion of 
people enrolled in a workplace or personal scheme, the level of their holdings and 
compare these with those not enrolled in a scheme.  We present results for unpartnered 
individuals and for couples. 
Enrolment in a superannuation scheme 
Unpartnered Individuals 
Of the total population of unpartnered individuals, 88.4% have neither type of 
superannuation scheme (see Appendix Table 1), while 0.6% have both; 3.7% have a 
workplace (WP) scheme and 7.3% of all those individuals have a personal scheme. 
Appendix Table 1- Unpartnered individuals who have either a workplace or personal 
superannuation scheme (Number and Percentage) 
   Does the respondent have a Personal Super Scheme? 
     No  Yes 
No  823,014  88.4% 67,880  7.3%  Does the respondent 
have a WP Super 
Scheme?  Yes  34,123  3.7% 5,942 0.6% 
There are virtually no differences between unpartnered males and females in the rate of 
enrolment in either type of superannuation scheme (see Appendix Table 2). 
Appendix Table 2- Holdings and value of workplace or personal superannuation 











 Male  Female  All  Individuals 
Has a WP Scheme (%)  4.4  4.2  4.3 
Has a Personal Scheme (%)  7.9  8  7.93 
Has Both (%)  0.7  0.6  0.64 
Value of WP Scheme      
Mean 78,336  31,065  52,387 
Median 10,000  13,635  11,665 
Value of Personal Scheme      
Mean 40,395  55,079  48,723 
Median 6,500  16,844  12,000  
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Turning to couples, in 31.4% of the cases at least one partner reported having a 
superannuation scheme; 12.4% have a workplace scheme, 15.4% have a personal 
scheme and 3.6% have both.  The remaining 68.6% of couples have no superannuation 
scheme (see Appendix Table 3).
12
 
Appendix Table 3 - Couples who have either a workplace or personal 
superannuation scheme (Number and Percentage) 
   Does either partner have a Personal Super Scheme? 
     No  Yes 
No  587,208  68.6% 131,853  15.4%  Does either partner 
have a WP Super 
Scheme?  Yes  105,675  12.4% 31,124  3.6% 
 
Value of holdings in superannuation schemes  
Unpartnered Individuals 
Overall, the mean value of the holdings in workplace schemes by unpartnered individuals 
is $52,400 and in personal schemes is $48,700 (Appendix Table 2).  Clearly these 
distributions are highly skewed with a few individuals having very large holdings, as the 
median holdings are respectively $11,700 and $12,000. 
Notably, the median holding by females is much higher than that for males for both types 
of schemes.  The median level of personal superannuation by females is greater than 
their median level in workplace schemes.  Overall the results suggest that women make 
greater use of personal rather than employer-based schemes.  To the extent that women 
have more broken employment histories they may well enrol in a personal scheme which 
typically has more portability than a workplace scheme. 
Another explanation for the higher median holdings by females may lie in fundamental 
gender differences.  Odean and Barber (2001) argue that males tend to be overconfident 
about their own ability to invest.  In this case, we might then expect males to hold a more 
aggressive portfolio than putting aside funds in a superannuation scheme.  And even 
where males do hold schemes they manage them in such a way as to result in lower 
returns and hence have lower median holdings in the long run.  
Among unpartnered females with employer-based schemes, 24% have holdings less than 
$5,000 and 55% have holdings between $10,000 and $50,000.  Only 4% of females have 
holdings over $100,000 compared with 18% of males.  These results are consistent with a 
higher median but lower mean for females. 
                                                                 
12 The enrolment rates in New Zealand compared to other countries may well be influenced by taxation policy.  In New Zealand, 
contributions to schemes are made from after-tax income, the earnings are taxed and the withdrawals exempt. For a comparison of 
taxation regimes for savings see OECD. It is possible that there is a relationship between length of employment with current employer 
and the presence of a workplace scheme.  In other words, if those who have a workplace scheme have a reasonable period of service, 
the fact that they belong may be an indication of having been employed when memberships were open, rather than necessarily 
reflecting greater concern for preparation for retirement.  Unfortunately the HSS does not give length of service with current 
employment.  
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Almost one half of females enrolled in a personal scheme have holdings in excess of 
$20,000, in contrast to males where only 35% of those with a personal scheme have 
holdings at this level, again reinforcing the result that women appear to make greater use 
of personal schemes. 
For unpartnered individuals not holding an employer-based scheme, the median total net 
worth is $6,000 for males and $11,900 for females.  In comparison those holding such 
schemes (many of whom will be older workers) have median net worth of $60,000 and 
$63,100 of net worth respectively (Appendix Table 4). 
Appendix Table 4 - Median Values of net worth and workplace superannuation for 
unpartnered individuals by quintiles of net worth 
Quintile of  Median Net Worth for those  For those having a Workplace Scheme: 
Net  with no WP Scheme  Median Net Worth  Median Value of WP Scheme 
Wealth  Males  Females Males  Females  Males  Females 
1  -8,580  -8,415 -15,140  -12,079  7,000  720 
2  300  305 2,831  No  observations  3,025  No observations 
3  10,451  9,510 10,399  11,143  680  6,506 
4  62,966  89,309 49,783  77,150  10,598  20,000 
5  305,151  278,200 358,430  303,950  135,587  28,000 
Total  6,000  11,920 60,000  63,100  10,000  13,635 
 
The value of the scheme rises sharply with the level of net worth especially for males. 
Overall, the average contribution of employer based schemes to total net worth among 
those holding schemes is over one third (see Appendix Table 5). 
Appendix Table 5 - Mean values of net worth and value of workplace 
superannuation scheme for unpartnered individuals by quintiles of net 
worth 
For those having a WP Scheme  Quintile 
Net 
Worth 
Mean NW of those 
with no WP 
Scheme  Mean Net Worth 




1  -13,732 -85,285  3,927 -0.33 
2  668 1,474 1,532 0.96 
3  11,366 13,571  6,001 0.55 
4  81,151 79,842 19,987 0.29 
5  391,144 496,786 102,446 0.27 
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The median net worth of couples with a workplace scheme is over $100,000 more than 
couples without a scheme.  The median ratio of holdings to total net worth by couples with 
at least one partner enrolled is 17% (see Appendix Table 6).  The workplace scheme 
represents a greater share of retirement wealth amongst the lower wealth quintiles.   
Amongst the richest net worth quintile those with a workplace scheme have lower median 
net worth than those without such a scheme.  The high net worth quintile has a 
disproportionate share of self employed individuals who by definition would not have a 
current employer making a contribution. 
Appendix Table 6 - Median values of net worth and workplace superannuation for 
couples by quintiles of net worth 




Worth for those 




Median Value of 
WP Scheme 
Median Ratio 
WP: Total Net 
Worth 
1 1,000  11,300  5,000  0.66 
2 67,700  73,828  13,746  0.17 
3 168,700  182,097  23,356  0.16 
4 332,262  346,094  57,000  0.17 
5 774,699  703,244  119,406  0.17 
Total 152,010  269,180  40,278  0.17 
 
There is some tendency for the proportion of couples enrolled in a workplace scheme to 
increase with age up til 45-55, but the overall trend is not striking (Appendix Table 7).  The 
same is true for unpartnered individuals.  It might have been expected that older cohorts 
who had entered the workforce at time when workplace superannuation schemes were 
more prevalent would have shown a greater enrolment rate than younger cohorts.  It is 
possible that they did in fact join in greater numbers (perhaps because in some cases 
membership was compulsory) and have subsequently cashed in their schemes.   
Alternatively it might be the case that the younger age groups are in fact enrolling at rate 
similar to that which people have always enrolled, at least in the case of personal 
schemes. 
As would be expected, the value of the holdings increases markedly with age and for 
older couples workplace superannuation reflects an important share of their total net 
worth.  Furthermore, the share of total retirement wealth that is represented by workplace 
schemes tends to be higher when approaching retirement for both males and females in 
couples.  In three out of the four age groups unpartnered women have higher median 
holdings in workplace schemes than men.  
While only 15% of all partnered males nearing retirement (ages 56-64) are enrolled, 
among those who are enrolled the median ratio of holdings to total net worth is one half. In 
other words, for almost 1 in 6 pre-retirement partnered males, workplace superannuation 
represents an important share of their total retirement wealth accumulation.  
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Appendix Table 7 - Holdings of workplace schemes: by age and gender 
Partnered Unpartnered  Age 
Group 
 
Male Female Total  Male Female Total 
25-34  Proportion  Enrolled  (%)  13.1 6.7 9.6 5.6 5.8 5.7 
  Median Value of WP Scheme  10,157  13,435  10,726  3,023  11,665  6,506 
  Median ratio of Value of WP in Net 
Worth excl. Value of WP 
0.16 0.27 0.22 0.07 0.34 0.07 
35-44  Proportion  Enrolled  (%)  13.3 5.8 9.4 9.6 7.9 8.6 
  Median Value of WP Scheme  50,309  10,426  26,235  25,000  15,000  15,000 
  Median ratio of Value of WP in Net 
Worth excl. Value of WP 
0.49 0.08 0.31 0.64 0.22 0.33 
45-55  Proportion  Enrolled  (%)  16.6 6.1  11.6  10.7 5.8 7.8 
  Median Value of WP Scheme  53,520  40,000  45,000  30,000  44,288  32,380 
  Median ratio of Value of WP in Net 
Worth excl. Value of WP 
0.42 0.18 0.28 0.15 0.28 0.19 
56-64  Proportion  Enrolled  (%)  14.6 5.0 9.8 4.8 8.9 7.5 
  Median Value of WP Scheme  150,000  60,000  124,689  10,272  25,000  20,000 
  Median ratio of Value of WP in Net 
Worth excl. Value of WP 
0.55 0.36 0.53 0.03 0.18 0.18 
 
Of couples in which at least one partner holds a workplace scheme, over 40% have in 
excess of $50,000 value in the scheme.  Over 60% of couples holding a personal scheme 
have more than $20,000. 
A summary across all individuals and couples is given in Appendix Table 8.  For both 
males and females, those holding either type of superannuation scheme have typically 
twice the net worth of the population as a whole.  Unpartnered females have greater 
accumulations in both types of scheme and greater total net worth than their male 
counterparts.  
Appendix Table 8 - Median values of net worth and superannuation schemes 
  For those who hold a workplace 
scheme 




  Total NW  WP Scheme  Total NW  Personal 
Scheme  Total NW 
Females        
Unpartnered  63,100 13,635  109,200 16,884 13,100 
Partnered  134,297 19,591  129,575 12,984 79,009 
All   106,866    15,198  122,730  14,174  60,690 
Males       
Unpartnered  60,000 10,000 51,500  6,500  7,772 
Partnered  171,810 46,782  143,300 20,000 88,000 
All   156,262  43,482  130,805  19,000  57,300   
      
Couples  269,180  40,278 249,814  20,000 172,210 
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In summary, both individuals and couples who have a workplace scheme appear to have 
much higher median levels of net worth.  The exception is those couples in the highest 
wealth quintile.  This suggests that belonging to a scheme does result in greater overall 
retirement accumulation.  It may be however that those enrolled have higher incomes, are 
more educated, or display some other particular characteristics.  A valid comparison 
requires that we hold constant at least some of these differences across individuals.  We 
conduct such a comparison in the Section 3.  
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Appendix B: Full Regression Results 
Appendix Table 9 ￿ Regression results ￿ testing whether a super scheme is a 
substitute or a complement to other forms of retirement saving for 
individuals 
  Value of Workplace Super scheme  Value of Personal Super scheme 
  Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Log super scheme  0.25  4.74***  0.32  6.51*** 
Male*Log super scheme  -0.14  -2.48**  -0.06  -1.23 
Partnered*Log super scheme  -0.12  -2.19**  -0.16  -3.08*** 
Has another Super scheme  0.51 3.68***  0.55 4.00*** 
Personal characteristics      
Male 1.37  2.51** 0.45 0.95 
Partnered 1.53  2.99*** 1.72  3.50*** 
Age 0.64  3.88*** 0.45  3.48*** 
Age  squared  -0.01 -3.02***  -0.01 -2.94*** 
Age  cubed 7.56E-05  2.53** 5.68E-05  2.66*** 
Pakeha 0.04 0.38 0.14 1.30 
Migrant -0.37  -3.29*** -0.12 -1.16 
Residence      
Rural 0.32  1.82* 0.04 0.38 
Metropolitan region  0.19  2.06**  -0.11  -1.48 
Education      
Years  of  education 0.00 0.00 0.03  2.09** 
Inheritances      
Inherited  >$10,000 0.25  1.80* 0.11 0.89 
Inheritance amount   1.66E-06  1.62  4.31E-06  4.98*** 
Expecting  inheritances 0.30  3.25*** 0.24  2.90*** 
Income      
Main  source=Self-employment 0.51  2.43** 0.60  6.06*** 
Main source= ￿Other￿ # 0.30 0.58  -0.39  -2.28** 
Total income   2.83E-05  6.22***  1.43E-05  5.99*** 
Income  squared -8.94E-11  -3.76*** -2.03E-11  -2.89*** 
Constant -4.37  -1.93* -0.91 -0.46 
Sample size  553 835 
Adjusted R-squared  0.52 0.40 
F-statistic for overall model  F(21, 531) = 29.51***  F(21, 813) = 27.09*** 
Note: The dependent variable is log net worth excluding the value of the super scheme on the RHS. The t-statistics are based on the 
test of the hypothesis that the coefficient is different from zero. *Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level. #The reference category is that group whose main source of income is wages and salaries.  
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Appendix Table 10 ￿ Regression results ￿ testing whether a super scheme is a 
substitute or a complement to other forms of retirement saving for couples 
  Value of Workplace Super scheme  Value of Personal Super scheme 
 Coefficient  t-value  Coefficient  t-value 
Log super scheme  0.09  2.70***  0.11  3.43*** 
Couple￿s characteristics      
Respondent￿s  age  0.31 1.38 0.47  2.29** 
Respondent￿s age squared  -0.01  -1.10  -0.01  -2.06** 
Respondent￿s age cubed  3.68E-05  0.94  6.66E-05  1.90* 
Partner￿s age  0.02  1.71*  0.02  1.99** 
Married  couple  0.17 1.15 0.22  1.77* 
Both partners are Pakeha  0.16  1.17  0.26  2.30** 
Either partner is migrant  -0.30  -2.33**  -0.11  -0.97 
Residence      
Rural  0.40  1.83* 0.11 0.84 
Metropolitan region  0.29  2.56**  -0.19  -2.09** 
Education      
Respondent￿s years of education  -0.02  -1.00  0.03  1.84* 
Partner￿s years of education  0.01  0.47  0.02  1.31 
Inheritances      
Inherited  >$10,000  0.17 1.20 0.21  1.85* 
Inheritance amount   9.10E-07  1.10  2.50E-06  3.26*** 
Expecting  inheritances  0.52  4.43*** 0.10 1.06 
Income      
Main source=Self-employment  0.39  1.68*  0.40  3.55*** 
Main source= ￿Other￿ # 0.85  0.97  -0.52 -1.97** 
Total income   1.57E-05  5.56***  1.08E-05  4.88*** 
Income  squared  -2.56E-11 -3.72***  -1.71E-11 -2.82*** 
Constant  2.74 0.89 1.16 0.40 
Sample size  422 552 
Adjusted R-squared  0.42 0.32 
F-statistic for overall model    F(19, 402) = 17.10***  F(19, 532) = 14.55*** 
Note: The dependent variable is log net worth excluding the value of the super scheme on the RHS. The t-statistics are based on the 
test of the hypothesis that the coefficient is different from zero. *Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level. #The reference category is that group whose main source of income is wages and salaries. 